For Moscow, the sanctions have hit its access to critical technology most, and it is now almost entirely China-dependent in this sector.
Delhi’s exercise of ‘strategic autonomy’ over the last one year has been premised on its long-standing partnership with Russia, but Moscow’s cosying up with Beijing is certainly putting pressure on that relationship
By: Editorial
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow brought reaffirmation of the partnership between the two countries that remains strong despite differences over the war in Ukraine and the notable absence of the phrase “friendship without limits” in the joint statement. Xi and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin reiterated the cornerstones that define the relationship: All attempts to impose a “rules-based order” are meant to halt the march towards an end to the “hegemony” of a single superpower; the viability of the multi-polar world depends on a non-discriminatory acceptance of the interests of all countries. Coming soon after the International Criminal Court’s warrant of arrest against Putin on charges of war crimes, Xi’s visit was a diplomatic morale booster for the Russian leader. Xi, for his part, was sending a signal to the world that China will do business with all, but on its terms. With Russia under western sanctions, and Xi seeing in Putin’s economic challenges opportunities to boost the Chinese economy, trade between the two countries has risen sharply. Russia is now China’s biggest supplier of oil, and even without the widely expected agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, Moscow now meets most of China’s energy requirements. Energy trade has been described by Chinese officials as the “ballast” of bilateral trade. For Moscow, the sanctions have hit its access to critical technology most, and it is now almost entirely China-dependent in this sector.
Belying expectations in some quarters that China, after its foray into peacemaking in West Asia, was now preparing to persuade Putin to end the war, Xi’s visit yielded nothing substantive on this front — except China’s assessment that Russia was ready to make efforts to restart peace talks, and Moscow’s appreciation of Beijing’s “positive role” in the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis and the considerations set forth in the document “On China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis”. China has offered no proposals in this position paper, but it lists “12 principles”, including respect for “sovereignty of all countries”, “abandoning Cold War mentality”, ceasing hostilities, resuming peace talks and stopping unilateral sanctions, which, it claims, make the case for peace talks. It is doubtful if China, positioned on the Russian side, can bring the same cred it had as a neutral party for the Saudi-Iran patch-up. The larger question is if China wants a war that keeps US energies focused on Europe, to end at all.
The China-Russia tango presents two challenges for India. Delhi’s exercise of “strategic autonomy” over the last one year has been premised on its long-standing partnership with Russia, but Moscow’s cosying up with Beijing is certainly putting pressure on that relationship. Putin and Xi have condemned the Quad grouping of which India is a part. Moscow’s positions on India’s LAC troubles with China fall well below what Delhi would like to hear from a friend, and it is not clear how that can be changed. Secondly, internationally, the success of India’s presidency of the G20 will be measured on the outcome document, which needs the co-operation of both Moscow and Beijing. As was evident from the meetings of the G20 finance and foreign ministers this month, that could prove difficult.
© The Indian Express (P) Ltd