While the military must be allowed to seek tactical advantage, it is also time for India to shift diplomatic gears from “reactive” to “proactive” (Express Archive)
Arun Prakash and Ashok Hukku write: The December 9 clash should serve as a harsh reminder of the close call that today’s Arunachal Pradesh had in 1962
Written by Arun Prakash , Ashok Hukku
December 19, 2022 2:01:33 pm
John F Kennedy’s aphorism — “Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan” — was proved right (again) on the 60th anniversary of the 1962 India-China War this year when no official homage was paid by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) or any politician to the fallen of 1962 at New Delhi’s National War Memorial.
Indian casualties in the 1962 China-India war, according to MoD figures, were 4,126 soldiers dead, wounded and missing in action, and 3,968 taken prisoner by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While some Indian army units may have commemorated, with pride, the sanguinary battles of Rezang La and Walong, for the rest of the country, 65 per cent of whose citizens were born after 1962, this seems to be a forgotten war.
The December 9 clash between Indian troops and PLA soldiers in the vicinity of Tawang should serve as a harsh reminder of the close call that Arunachal Pradesh (then known as the North-Eastern Frontier Agency or NEFA) had in 1962. So, let us recall a bit of this history, lest it repeats itself.
Starting on October 20, 1962, the Chinese PLA advanced along two axes 500 miles apart — Tawang and Walong — and overcoming fierce but sporadic Indian resistance, overran NEFA in three weeks. On November 21, China declared a ceasefire and PLA troops withdrew 20 km behind the McMahon Line. The Indian Army had fought with courage and tenacity, often, to the last man and last bullet, but they were let down by a fatal combination of political complacency, faulty intelligence and military incompetence and pusillanimity.
According to Australian journalist, Neville Maxwell, Nehru’s foolhardy “forward policy” was based on flawed inputs from his confidant and Intelligence Bureau chief, B N Mullik, who assured him that whatever the Indians did, “there need be no fear of a violent Chinese reaction”. Since the PM placed such faith in Mullik, none of the army generals could muster the courage to challenge his flawed advice.
Sixty years later, we can take reassurance from the fact that India and its armed forces have come a long way and there will be no replay of the 1962 debacle. We must, however, bear in mind that China in this interregnum has seen phenomenal economic, technological and military growth and vies with the USA for the global “pole-position”. Today, the Chinese threat hangs like a sword of Damocles over our heads, and without actually going to war, they have imposed a huge economic burden on us by forcing the “counter-mobilisation” of 50,000-60,000 extra Indian troops, stretching an already lean defence budget.
Analysis indicates that the country’s post-Covid financial situation and depressed GDP growth rates will not permit any significant hike in defence expenditure. Such are the liabilities under the “pay and pension” heads that undertaking essential modernisation and re-equipment of the armed forces is not possible, even if the defence budget is hiked from the current 2.1 per cent to 2.5 per cent of the GDP, an unlikely prospect. Ill-conceived and ill-timed schemes like Agnipath and bans on import of military hardware are neither going to save money nor engender instant self-reliance. But at this critical juncture, they can erode combat-effectiveness.
Resumption of robust economic growth is the only panacea for the “guns vs butter” dilemma that India faces. However, given the gravity of threats confronting us, it is incumbent upon the government to fund defence expenditure that is vital for ensuring the nation’s security. There exists more than adequate scope for effecting savings — by cutting down on wasteful/non-essential government expenditure, by reducing vote-garnering subsidies, or by disinvestment/monetisation of idle assets. National defence is important enough to even warrant borrowing from the market.
There are some disturbing questions that lurk unanswered in every citizen’s mind. Does our ruling elite know what is driving China’s diplomatic and military bellicosity? How much longer will this 60-year-old Himalayan drama play out? Why are military commanders negotiating and where are our diplomats? What is our counter-strategy to deter China? Why is Parliament in the dark?
The answers to all these questions lie with our elaborate national security apparatus at whose apex sits the four-member Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by the PM. This committee, provided it meets when required, is meant to be the final arbiter on all matters of national security. Also in place are bodies like the high-powered National Security Council, the Strategic Policy Group, and the National Security Advisory Board, tasked with strategic analysis and evolution of policy options.
Given this elaborate set-up, it is perplexing that not only does India lack a China-specific strategy, but has yet to formulate a national security strategy (NSS). Preceded by a “reality check” in the form of a comprehensive defence review, the NSS would spell out national aims and objectives, outline the nation’s security goals and provide policy-guidance for the defence, foreign affairs and intelligence establishments.
Diplomats and commentators, attribute the dismal state of Sino-Indian relations to “misperceptions” and “trust deficit”. While this may be true of the border situation, we must acquire absolute clarity about China’s larger objectives. In Xi Jinping’s hegemonic grand-strategy, he sees India, especially if it acquires allies, as a regional hindrance that needs to be curbed. His compulsion in Siachen is to prevent the Indian Army from dominating Highway 219, and insulating the cherished China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from interference. Skirmishing and territorial creep in Ladakh and Arunachal are meant to keep India distracted and off-balance.
While the military must be allowed to seek tactical advantage, it is also time for India to shift diplomatic gears from “reactive” to “proactive”, starting with a calibrated brake on burgeoning Sino-Indian trade, whose deficit has zoomed past $70 billion. It is also time to break our silence and canvass international opinion via the UN, G20 and other international forums to pressurise China to come to the negotiating table. The Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement is now 30 years old and MEA needs to resume some old-fashioned diplomacy.
Prakash is a former navy chief and Hukku, a former general-officer-commanding an infantry division
Source: Indian Express